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However, nothing in the Appellate Division's decision revoking the
license compels that conclusion.2" It is submitted that the Wil-
liams court's mechanical application of the Felder per se rule to
facts different from those to which the rule was meant to apply led
it to unnecessarily and unwisely extend the scope of the rule.
Vacating a conviction years after it is rendered has far-reach-
ing consequences. Prosecutors are faced with the choice of dis-
missing the charges against a defendant, or retrying him, a difficult
task if witnesses are unavailable or have suffered memory lapses.2
Because application of the Felder rule was intended to be limited
to narrowly-defined factual settings, in cases outside its narrow
scope the more prudent approach would be to abandon the per se
rule, and instead analyze the effectiveness of counsel's representa-
tion on a case by case basis.
Claudia A. Farella
New York County Supreme Court expands the continuous rela-
tionship doctrine to toll the statute of limitations
The statute of limitations' protects persons who are called to
26 See In re Steinberg, 137 App. Div. 2d 110, 528 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 72 N.Y.2d 807, 529 N.E.2d 424, 533 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1988). The Appellate Division did
not at any point in its decision state that its findings or its order to revoke Steinberg's
license rendered Steinberg "unlicensed" throughout the seventeen years he had been admit-
ted to practice law. Id. Moreover, there is no indication or support in the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision for the Williams court's cbnclusion that the revocation applied retroactively.
Id.; see also Mishkoff, 135 App. Div. 2d at 58, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (court revoked attorney's
license but did not state that revocation rendered him unlicensed retroactively).
2 See Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 1983). The Solina court ac-
knowledged the severity of the consequences of a per se rule, stating that "[i]t may well be
impracticable for the Government to retry Solina 13 years after the event." Id.
1 See CPLR art. 2 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989). CPLR 201 provides: "An action...
must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is pre-
scribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court shall extend
the time limited by law for the commencement of an action." CPLR 201 (McKinney 1972).
Courts, however, may extend the time limitation for performing certain procedural require-
ments, see id. 2004, and a defendant's actions may be deemed by the court to estop him or
her from pleading the defense. See, e.g., Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 448-50, 377
N.E.2d 713, 716-17, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262-63 (1978) (plaintiff relieved of time bar where
physician's intentional concealment of malpractice delayed commencement of action). The
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
defend stale claims after the expiration of a specified period of
time.2 The general rule in professional malpractice cases is that the
cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run
on the date of the act of malpractice, not on the date of the in-
jury's discovery. 3 In certain circumstances, however, running of the
estoppel exception is derived from the statutory law which allows the court to find that
because of the defendant's conduct, it would be "inequitable to permit him to interpose the
defense of the statute of limitation." GOL § 17-103(4)(b) (McKinney 1978).
At common law, no statute of limitations existed; the right to a cause of action survived
the joint lifetimes of the parties. See SIEGEL § 33, at 34 (1978). The origin of modern time
limitations traces back to the English Limitation Act of 1623, see 1 WK&M I 201.01, at 2-7
(1988), apparently enacted to keep inconsequential claims out of the King's court. See De-
velopments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1950). To-
day in New York, the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is regarded as having the power
to alter the operation of the statute of limitations. See Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 App. Div. 2d
738, 745-46, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583 (2d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900, 415 N.E.2d 979,
434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980).
For a general discussion of the changes in the statute of limitations that occurred when
the CPLR replaced the CPA, see Hesson, The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 27
ALB. L. REv. 175, 177-78 (1963).
2 See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969). "The Statute of Limitations was enacted to afford protection to
defendants against defending stale claims after a reasonable period of time had elapsed dur-
ing which a person of ordinary diligence would bring an action." Id.
Various policy considerations have been set forth as advantages of limitations periods.
First, they are statutes of repose, beneficial to society as a whole. See Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963). A second factor is the effect the passage of time has on the
ability of the parties to receive a fair trial due to the loss of or diminished reliability of
evidence. See 1 WK&M V 201.01, at 2-8. But see United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147
F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1945) ("statutes of limitation are [not] in any degree for the purpose
of relieving courts of the trial of issues which have become hard to decide by the loss of
evidence"). Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that such statutes force parties with valid
claims to bring them quickly, with the passage of years creating a presumption against the
claim's validity. See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868).
The parties themselves can virtually always agree in writing to shorten the applicable
limitations period, see CPLR 201, commentary at 57 (McKinney 1972), but to extend the
period the parties must enter an agreement after the action has accrued. Id. 201(3), com-
mentary at 58.
3 See 1 WK&M I 214.20, at 2-244. Courts have applied the general accrual rule to mal-
practice by various professionals. See Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 439 N.E.2d 390, 453
N.Y.S.2d 674 (1982) (accountants); Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at 212, 188 N.E.2d at 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d at 714 (physicians); Starbo v. Ruddy, 66 App. Div. 2d 950, 411 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d
Dep't 1978) (attorneys); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 54 App. Div. 2d 13, 385
N.Y.S.2d 613 (2d Dep't 1976) (architects), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 613, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401
N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977).
Strict application of the rule has occasionally led to inequitable results where a plain-
tiff's claim has been deemed time-barred by the court. In Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chemical Corp., the plaintiff had a substance that was manufactured by the defendant in-
serted into his sinuses for visibility in X-rays. 12 N.Y.2d at 215, 188 N.E.2d at 143, 237
1988]
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malpractice limitations period is tolled under the continuous treat-
ment/continuous relationship doctrine.4 Developed originally in
the physician-patient context,5 the doctrine has been judicially ex-
tended to other professional relationships.' Recently, in McCabe v.
N.Y.S.2d at 715. Thirteen years later, the plaintiff had an eye removed, allegedly because
some of the substance had remained in his head and caused cancer. Id. The action was
commenced two years later, but the court held that the statute of limitations had expired
because the cause of action accrued when the substance entered the plaintiff's body. Id. at
217, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The court concluded that because the provision
in the CPLR for the discovery rule expressly listed only cases of fraud, the legislature did
not intend to expand the exception any further. Id. at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d
at 718; see also Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 1099,
500 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (1986) (legislature, not court, must change general accrual rule);
Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981) ("further extension... [is] a matter best reserved for the Legisla-
ture"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982).
In 1986, the New York State legislature enacted a "discovery of injury" rule for deter-
mining accrual in cases involving "the latent effects of exposure to any substance." CPLR
214-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989). Nevertheless, the traditional rule remains applicable in
most cases.
' See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778-79, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962). In Borgia, the Court of Appeals recognized the continuous treat-
ment doctrine for the first time, stating that the doctrine delayed accrual of the malpractice
claim. Id. The court subsequently revised the concept, holding that the doctrine merely
tolled the running of the statute of limitations rather than actually delaying the claim's
accrual; the claim still accrues upon performance of the alleged malpractice. See, e.g., Mc-
Dermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 407, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1111-12, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 354-55
(1982). This distinction serves two purposes: it allows the plaintiff to bring an action before
the continuous relationship has ended, see id., and it allows other statutory tolls to operate
during that relationship. See Glamm, 57 N.Y.2d at 94-95, 439 N.E.2d at 394, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 678-79.
' See Borgia, 12 N.Y.2d at 155, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321. The court in
Borgia held that in cases of medical malpractice, when treatment related to the underlying
injury is continued, the statute of limitations does not accrue until the treatment ends. See
id. The majority found support for its holding in Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165
N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960), which itself had referred to five cases accepting the
doctrine. See Borgia, 12 N.Y.2d at 156, 187 N.E.2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Additional
support was provided by a commentator who noted historical recognition of the theory. Id.
(citing Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdic-
tions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1962)).
CPLR 214-a, applicable to medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice, provides that
"[a]n action ... must be commenced within two years and six months of the act ... or last
treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness . . . ." CPLR 214-a
(McKinney Supp. 1989). The section was codified after being recognized in case law. See
supra.
6 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Suthers, 68 App. Div. 2d 790, 418 N.Y.S.2d 679 (4th Dep't
1979) (attorney-client); Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't
1968) (same); County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d
998 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974) (architect-client); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74
Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1973) (accountant-client). It
should be noted that in addition to being fiduciary relationships, these relationships are also
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
RMJ Securities,7 the Supreme Court, New York County, extended
the doctrine of continuous relationship by applying it to a situa-
tion involving the relationship between the executors and the ben-
eficiaries of an estate.8
In McCabe, the beneficiaries of an estate brought an action
against the executors,9 alleging a breach of fiduciary duty.10 The
decedent, John McSharry, the founder of RMJ Securities
("RMJ"), had entered into an agreement with the company's other
shareholders providing for the mandatory redemption of the corpo-
ration's stock at book value plus an agreed goodwill factor upon
the death of any shareholder." The defendants, one of whom was
an RMJ shareholder, were appointed executors of McSharry's es-
tate.12 Pursuant to the shareholder agreement, RMJ purchased the
stock from the estate for $220,000.13 Nine months later, Security
Pacific Corporation purchased RMJ for sixteen million dollars. 4
In their suit, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had
halted ongoing buy-out negotiations immediately following Mc-
Sharry's death in order to ensure low valuation of his stock. 5 The
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants intentionally kept the
decedent and his estate uninformed regarding the negotiations and
their possible effect on the value of McSharry's shares. 6 However,
professional relationships. It is suggested that the doctrine be limited to a continuous rela-
tionship between a professional and client, where the fiduciary has special training. See
infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
7 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1988, at 21, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
8 See id.
9 Id. This action was brought by six residuary beneficiaries of the estate; a seventh
instituted an action in federal court in New York. Id. at 22, col. 1.
10 Id. at 21, col. 6. Originally, RMJ, four RMJ shareholders, and the two executors of
McSharry's estate were named as defendants. Id. However, the claims against all but the
executors were dismissed. See infra note 19. The plaintiffs also alleged fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty against the RMJ shareholders, as well as two causes of action sounding in
contract. McCabe, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1988, at 22, col. 1. This Survey only refers to the execu-
tor defendants.
"' McCabe, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1988, at 22, col. 1.
12 Id. Defendant Cates was included among the five shareholder parties of RMJ who
entered into the redemption agreement. Id.
13 Id. Justice Cohen recognized that the stock purchase in August 1981 was the latest
date the fiduciary breach could have occurred. Id.
14 Id. Security Pacific Corporation ("Security Pacific") purchased RMJ in May 1982.
Id.
15 Id. Negotiations were ongoing between RMJ and Security Pacific up to the time of
McSharry's death. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that RMJ and Security Pacific came to an
agreement before McSharry died. Id.
16 Id.
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it was not until seven years after RMJ purchased the stock from
the estate that plaintiffs interposed their claim for compensatory
and punitive damages for this alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 7
The defendants, in response, contended that the action's six-year
limitations period had expired.'
The court in McCabe denied the defendants' motion to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that it was time-barred. 9 Writ-
ing for the court, Justice Cohen held that under the continuous
relationship doctrine, the running of the limitation period was
tolled at least until RMJ was bought out because the executors
had continuously represented the estate during that time.2" Justice
Cohen emphasized the special fiduciary duty an executor owes the
estate he serves. 2' In expanding the types of situations to which
the continuous relationship doctrine applies, the court relied upon
the relative inequality between the parties,2 2 stressing the fiducia-
ries' superior knowledge of the substantive matter underlying the
relationship,23 as well as the beneficiaries' reliance on the good
faith of the fiduciaries and their ignorance of the need to question
the fiduciaries' actions.24
While it was appropriate for the court to examine the continu-
ous relationship doctrine in light of the facts presented, it is sub-
mitted that the McCabe court erroneously broadened the scope of
the doctrine by allowing for the tolling of the limitations period
during the executors' involvement in negotiations. Although re-
cently the doctrine has been increasing in scope, its past applica-
tions had been limited to disputes involving professional relation-
17 Id. The claim was interposed in April 1988, after the limitations period had expired
if computed according to the general rule. See id. Plaintiffs sought their proportional shares
of the difference between the amount paid to the estate for the stock and the amount paid
to the RMJ shareholders in the buy-out. Id.
18 Id. at 21, col. 6.
19 Id. at 22, col. 1. The court denied the motion to dismiss as time-barred only as to the
estate executors. Id.
20 Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not have discovered the breach until
May 1982, the date Security Pacific purchased RMJ. Id. at 22, col. 2.
21 Id. at 22, cols. 1-2.
22 Id. at 22, col. 2. The court listed the cases expanding the continuous relationship
doctrine to professional relationships between clients and architects, accountants, and attor-
neys, concluding that the doctrine should also apply to an executor-beneficiary relationship.
Id.
23 Id. (citing County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d
998 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974)).
24 Id. The beneficiary must rely on the fiduciary's good faith "if only to avoid compro-
mising a sensitive relationship." Id.
[Vol. 63:168
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ships.25 While the court's action may seem a logical next step, it is
suggested that expansion of the doctrine to cover a non-profes-
sional relationship represents an unwarranted deviation from prior
judicial rulings.2" The requisite qualifications of executors are min-
imal and they, unlike professionals, are not charged with any spe-
cial skill to carry out their duty.2 7 Therefore, it is submitted that in
employing the continuous treatment doctrine in actions against es-
tate executors, the court unfairly held non-professionals to a pro-
fessional standard of care.
In direct conflict with the McCabe decision, other lower courts
have refused to apply the continuous relationship doctrine to non-
professionals. 28 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has expressly
indicated that a professional relationship is necessary to invoke the
25 See cases cited supra note 6.
26 See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 94, 436 N.E.2d 496, 501, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46,
51 (1982). Until McCabe, the doctrine had been applied only to those cases involving a
professional acting in a fiduciary capacity. See Greene, 56 N.Y.2d at 94, 436 N.E.2d at 501,
451 N.Y.S.2d at 51. Because medical malpractice is the only professional malpractice con-
trolled by statute with regard to the continuous relationship doctrine, "with respect to other
types of professional dereliction, judicial authority has been left intact." Id. The case law, in
clear language, limits the application of the doctrine to professional relationships. See Board
of Educ. v. Thompson Constr. Corp., 111 App. Div. 2d 497, 498-99, 488 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882
(3d Dep't 1985) ("[s]tatute of [Iimitations was tolled for as long as the confidential profes-
sional relationship . . . existed") (emphasis added). In Greene, the court emphatically
stated that "the rule recognizes that a person seeking professional assistance has a right to
repose confidence in the professional's ability," adding that "[o]n this basis the continuous
treatment rule has been held applicable to other types of professionals." See 56 N.Y.2d at
94, 436 N.E.2d at 500, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
27 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT § 707 (McKinney 1963). Section 707 merely lists those
limited persons not qualified to serve as an executor, including an infant, an incompetent,
and a felon. Id. The statute also provides that the court may, in its discretion, declare some-
one ineligible for their inability to read or write English. Id. See generally In re Estate of
Wenig, 31 Misc. 2d 903, 905, 222 N.Y.S.2d 205, 207 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961) (statutory
grounds for disqualification are exclusive); In re Canter, 146 Misc. 123, 127, 261 N.Y.S. 872,
877 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1933) (limitations disqualifying executors must be strictly con-
strued in favor of eligibility).
2s See Thompson Constr., 111 App. Div. 2d at 499, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 882. The Thomp-
son Construction court found no professional relationship between a general contractor and
a school district on which to toll the limitations period. Id.; see also Flora's Card Shop v.
Paul Krantz & Co., 111 Misc. 2d 907, 908, 445 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1981) (although "doctrine has been extended to lawyers and other professionals," court re-
fused to apply it to insurance broker), aff'd, 91 App. Div. 2d 938, 458 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1st
Dep't 1983). In dicta, however, the Flora's Card Shop court indicated that had the defend-
ant "made any misrepresentation which induced the plaintiff to delay the commencement of
the action," the plaintiff might have been able to raise the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
prevent the defendant from using the statute of limitations as a defense. Id.; see infra note
33 and accompanying text.
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continuous relationship doctrine. 9 It is suggested that the McCabe
court's reliance upon the fiduciary relationship as a basis for ex-
tending the doctrine" was, therefore, dubious. In fact, the Court of
Appeals arguably rejected such reasoning when it failed to apply
the continuous relationship doctrine to another non-professional fi-
duciary relationship, that between an escrow agent and his client.-1
It is submitted that it was inappropriate for the McCabe court "to
make such a quantum jump in the law to fit an appealing case."32
Of course, had the court found that the defendant had made any
affirmative misrepresentation inducing the plaintiff to delay com-
mencement of the action, the court could have invoked the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel to prevent the defendant from raising
the statute of limitations as a defense.33 Absent such a finding,
however, no amount of unfairness to a particular plaintiff may
override application of the statute of limitations.
While refusal to expand the continuous relationship doctrine
may appear harsh in some instances, an expansion endangers the
very purpose underlying the statute of limitations. It is suggested
29 See Cabrini Medical Center v. Desina, 64 N.Y.2d 1059, 1062, 479 N.E.2d 217, 219,
489 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1985); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
See Lazzaro v. Kelly, 57 N.Y.2d 630, 632, 439 N.E.2d 868, 868, 454 N.Y.S.2d 59, 59
(1982). The court ruled that "[s]ervice as an escrow agent does not provide a basis for invo-
cation of the continuous representation doctrine." Id.
32 Flora's Card Shop, 111 Misc. 2d at 908, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 393. The Flora's Card Shop
court refused to expand the continuous relationship doctrine to an insurance broker where
the defendant broker agreed to obtain insurance for the plaintiff, but failed to do so. Id. at
907-08, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94.
33 See, e.g., Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 211, 213, 214
N.Y.S.2d 849, 852 (4th Dep't 1961). In Erbe, plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an estate
and brought an action against its trustee when the trustee purchased stock from the estate.
Id. at 212-13, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 851. The court held that in an action for breach of a fiduciary
relationship, a trustee could not take advantage of the limitations statute where his actions
led the plaintiffs to believe no breach had occurred. Id. at 213, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The
defendant was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations under the court's power in
equity because of the false representations made to the plaintiffs. Id. at 215, 214 N.Y.S.2d at
853; cf. Board of Educ. v. Thompson Constr. Corp., 111 App. Div. 2d 497, 499, 488 N.Y.S.2d
880, 882 (3d Dep't 1985) ("There is nothing in the record establishing that [the defendant]
made any representation which induced plaintiff to delay the commencement of the
action.").
In McCabe, there were no allegations that the defendant acted to induce the plaintiffs
not to file suit and, therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not applicable. The
doctrine of equitable estoppel is discussed in detail in Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377
N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978). See generally 1 WK&M 201.13, at 2-29 (discussing
equitable estoppel).
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that the exception was unwisely extended to the executor-benefi-
ciary relationship, and that application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in such instances would produce results more consistent
with the recognized intent behind limitations periods.
Kevin Murphy
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 214(2): Three-year statute of limitations provision for stat-
utorily-created causes of action is applicable to a claim by an es-
tate under the Dram Shop Act rather than the two-year period
for wrongful death actions in EPTL § 5-4.1
At common law, the victim of an alcohol-related accident had
no recourse against a commercial vendor of intoxicating liquors.'
In response to the troublesome problem of drunk driving,2 many
states, including New York,3 have extended liability to vendors
See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 83, 518 N.E.2d 896, 898, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3
(1987); see also Fox v. Mercer, 109 App. Div. 2d 59, 60, 489 N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (4th Dep't
1985) ("The Dram Shop Act created a cause of action unknown at common law by allowing
recovery against a tavern owner for injuries caused as a result of patron's intoxication
.... "); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 App. Div. 2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (3d Dep't 1980)
("Under the common law, no tort cause of action lay against one who furnished, whether by
sale or by gift, intoxicating liquor to a person who thereby became intoxicated ... ."). Com-
mon law courts refused to recognize liability of a commercial vendor because "[e]xcessive
alcohol consumption was deemed to be the proximate cause of injuries produced by the
inebriate; selling or furnishing alcohol to an adult who elected to become intoxicated was
not viewed as the root of the resulting harm." D'Amico, 71 N.Y.2d at 83, 518 N.E.2d at 898,
524 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
2 See Note, A Response to Deficiencies in Illinois Dramshop Liability, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 837, 837. The problem was especially ripe for a statutory solution, given the prevalence
of alcohol-related fatalities. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFC SAFETY ADMIN., FATAL Accimi.rr
REPORTING SYSTEM 1986, at 2-2. In 1986, it was estimated that 23,990 traffic accident fatali-
ties were alcohol-related. Id. Although this was a five percent decrease from 1982, it was in
fact a seven percent increase over the proportion of alcohol-related deaths occurring in 1985.
Id.
In response to the serious problem of drunk driving, President Reagan, in 1983, insti-
tuted the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. See Comment, Server vs. Driver Lia-
bility: A Suggested Change to Reduce Drinking and Driving, 7 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 257, 257
(1987). "The Commission found that at least 50 percent of all highway deaths involve the
use of alcohol" and that "the annual economic loss is estimated at 21 billion dollars." Id.
3 See GOL § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989). The statute provides that
1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or
